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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
MIDWEST REALTY AND FINANCE, 
INC., a Corporation, 
Case No. 14028 
Defendant and Appellant. 
oooOooo 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
oooOooo-— 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein the plaintiff-respondent 
seeks to recover for loans made to Lee Chair Corporation on the 
basis of a guarantee of such indebtedness by defendant-appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court granted judgment in favor of plaintiff-
respondents and against defendant-apellants for the total indebt-
edness of Lee Chair Corporation. 
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellants seek reversal of the judgment 
in total, or in the alternative, reversal of the judgment pertain-
ing to one line of credit extended to Lee Chair Corporation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to November 4, 1970, defendant-appellant 
(hereinafter referred to as "Midwest") was negotiating for a 
merger and consolidation wherein Lee Chair Corporation would be 
merged into Midwest International, Inc., and the surviving 
corporation would then be merged into Midwest (Tr. 10). It 
was determined that in order to keep Lee Chair Corporation 
viable during the negotiation period, it was necessary to 
procure financial assistance for Lee Chair Corporation (Tr. 11). 
Inasmuch as the financial status of Lee Chair 
Corporation was such that it was unable to obtain credit, 
Midwest contacted plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to 
as "Bank") for the purpose of inducing an extension of credit 
to Lee Chair Corporation (Tr. 11). 
Inasmuch as the Bank was unwilling to extend the 
credit to Lee Chair Corporation on the basis of its credit 
standing alone, (Tr. 11) Midwest executed and delivered to the 
Bank a "continuing guarantee" (Exhibit 3). The "continuining 
guarantee" was executed and delivered to the Bank on or about 
November 4, 1970. The execution and delivery of this guarantee 
was made by Midwest pursuant to the written authorization of 
its Board of Directors (Exhibit 4). The guarantee will here-
inafter be referred to as the "November Guarantee." 
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On the day following the execution and delivery of 
the guarantee, the Bank advanced to Lee Chair Corporation the 
sum of Sixty Thousand ($60,000.00) Dollars (Tr. 34). This loan 
was evidenced by a note bearing the date November 5, 1970 
(Tr. 34). The note was renewed on February 11, 1971; May 18, 
« 
1971; August 4, 1971; September 22, 1971 and on February 4, 
1972 after the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars 
principal (Tr. 34, Exhibit 16). Each renewal was accompanied 
by the payment of interest accruing to the date of the renewal 
(Exhibit 16). The last promissory note, dated February 4, 1972, 
is before the Court as Exhibit 2. With respect to this parti-
cular line of credit, each note was a renewal of pre-existing 
indebtedness; there was no new money advanced to Lee Chair 
Corporation. 
As merger negotiations continued, it was decided that 
in addition to the unsecured credit or Sixty Thousand ($60,000.00) 
Dollars, Lee Chair needed further financial assistance (Tr. 11). 
Application was made to the Bank to extend an additional line of 
credit secured by Lee Chair's accounts receivable (Exhibit 9). 
In order to induce the Bank to extend this additional credit, 
Midwest, on December 17, 1970, executed and delivered to the 
Bank another "continuing guarantee" (Exhibit 11). The execution 
and delivery of this guarantee was authorized by a resolution 
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of the Board of Directors of Midwest on December 17, 1970# 
(Exhibit 12). This guarantee will hereinafter be referred to 
as the "December Guarantee." 
In reliance upon the December Guarantee, the Bank 
extended to Lee Chair Corporation an open ended credit line 
secured by the Lee Chairfs accounts receivable (Exhibit 9). 
Credit extensions were granted as needed and payments on the 
accounts receivable were applied against the indebtedness. 
The extensions of credit and payments are itemized on Exhibit 
10. 
Negotiations for the merger apparently broke down 
and Midwest was faced with the problem of minimizing their 
loss under the guarantees. Midwest was faced with two alter-
natives: (a) terminate the guarantee thereby cutting off any 
future advances to Lee Chair; (b) place a ceiling on the 
guarantee at the level of the outstanding indebtedness thereby 
preventing the balance of the account from exceeding the 
amount of indebtedness which Midwest was already liable for. 
The first alternative had the danger of cutting off all funds 
and thereby forcing Lee Chair to discontinue business. This 
would sacrifice any chance of Lee Chair paying its own debt 
from current income. The second alternative had the advantages 
of freezing the loss at its present level, and still allowing 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
funds to go into the business in the hope of reducing the 
debt with current income* 
Midwest wisely chose the second alternative. In a 
letter dated July 6, 1971, to the Bank wherein they noted: 
"It is our desire that the guarantee be 
immediately reduced to the amount of the out-
standing obligations covered by the Lee Chair 
note. We believe this to be about $85f000.00." 
The letter in no way indicated a desire to terminate 
the guarantee or cut off future advances on the accounts 
receivable financing. In fact, thd content of the letter 
was precisely the opposite. All mention of cancellation was in 
the context of the future, and the letter specifically stated 
this was not to be a final cancellation: 
"It was the decision of the Board that we 
will withdraw the 'continuing guarantee1 of 
Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc., for and on 
behalf of Lee Chair Corporation. This guarantee 
is dated December 17, 1970, and is in the amount 
of $130,000.00. . . . W e would appreciate your 
earliest reply, indicating any further requirements 
for finalizing this cancellation." (Emphasis added) 
The decision to "cap" the guarantee rather than cancel 
the guarantee and cut off further funds turned out to be an 
advantageous decision for Midwest. At the time of the receipt 
of the July 6, 1971 letter (which was on July 8, 1971) the 
outstanding indebtedness on the accounts receivable credit line 
was Thirty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Dollars and 
i 
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97/100 cents ($32,672.97) (Exhibit 10). By capping the account, 
and allowing current income to reduce the indebtedness, the 
indebtedness was reduced by Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred 
Ninety-Eight Dollars and 71/100 cents ($23,798.71) (Exhibit 10) 
down to Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars and 
26/100 cents ($8,874.26). 
The letter of July 6, 1971, by its specific terms, 
applied only to the December Guarantee. There was no mention 
of the November Guarantee. The reason for designating only 
one guarantee is obvious: the indebtedness under the November 
Guarantee was already equal to the maximum limit of that guarantee 
and therefore no reason to "cap" the same. However, the 
December Guarantee permitted a limit of One Hundred Thirty 
Thousand ($130,000.00) Dollars and therefore was the only 
available means of reducing Midwest's exposure. 
On July 8, 1971, Mr. John G. Wells of Midwest 
telephoned the Bank and spoke with its Vice-President, Mr. 
Winrow. At that time the parties confirmed the agreement to 
cap the accounts receivable credit line at its existing balance 
(Exhibit 8). The substance of the telephone conversation was 
summarized in a letter from the Bank to Midwest which stated: 
"As to your letter of July 6, 1971, we 
have discussed this with Mr. Winrow and he stated 
that according to his conversation with Mr. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Wells, the intent of the letter was to "cap" 
the borrowing which was done." (Exhibit 8). 
Prior to this lawsuit, Midwest never contested the 
summarization of the telephone conversation as stated in the 
letter (Tr. 21). 
After receipt by the Bank of the letter of July 6, 
1971, (on July 8, 1971) the indebtedness of the accounts 
receivable credit line never exceeded the balance existing on that 
date (Exhibit 10). In factf the balance of the accounts recei-
vable credit line declined continuously from July 8, 1971, until 
the date of suit when it was reduced to its present balance of 
Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars and 26/100 
cents ($8#874.26). The decision to "cap" the account rather 
than to cancel the guarantee permitted Lee Chair to remain in 
business and reduce the accounts receivable credit line sub-
stantially. 
Inasmuch as the November Guarantee was never revoked/ 
capped or otherwise amended all renewals of that indebtedness 
were pursuant to the specific terms of the guarantee which 
permitted the Bank to "renew; extend, accelerate or otherwise 
change the time of payment of, or otherwise change the terms 
of the indebtedness or any part thereof, including increase 
or decrease in the rate of interest thereon. . ." (Exhibit 3) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-8-
The December Guarantee was amended only with respect to the upper 
limits so that the unamended terms of that guarantee specifically 
permitted the Bank to extend, renew and advance credit so long 
as the amended upper limit was not exceeded (Exhibit 11). 
As time passed Lee Chair was unable to respond to 
its obligations under the credit arrangements and the colla-
teral/ consisting of Leefs accounts receivablef was exhausted. 
The Bank made demand upon Midwest to respond pursuant to the 
terms of its guarantees. Midwest refused claiming that its 
letter of July 6, 1971, constituted a cancellation of both 
guarantees and it was not responsible for any extension of 
credit or renewal of credit occurring after receipt of said 
letter. Pursuant to this refusal to respond to the obligation 
stated in the guarantees, Midwest commenced this suit. 
At the trial, tY\e Court found that the letter of 
July 6, 1971, was not a cancellation of either guarantee and 
had the sole effect amending the upper limit of the December 
guarantee and that the Bank abided by the terms of the amended 
guarantee (R. 110-111). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LETTER OF JULY 6, 1971 DID NOT CANCEL OR 
REVOKE THE GUARANTEE OF MIDWEST 
The sole issue before the trial court was the intent 
behind the execution and delivery of the letter of July 6, 
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1971. Counsel for Midwest admitted during the course of the 
trial that the only disputed issue,was the meaning of the 
July 6, 1971 letter (Tr. 16), quoted on pp. 20-21, infra). 
All other issues are dependent on the disposition of this 
primary issue. In fact, all issues raised by Midwest in its 
Brief are rendered moot by a determination that the letter did 
not constitute a cancellation or revocation of the guarantees. 
The trial court, after a consideration of all of the 
facts presented at trial, determined: 
"The intent of Midwest as expressed in 
the letter of July 6, 1971, was to reduce the 
upper limit set forth in the continuing guarantee 
of December 17, 1970 (Exhibit 11) and establish 
a new upper limit of said guarantee in an amount 
equal to the outstanding indebtedness of Lee 
Chair Corporation to Wells Fargo Bank as of July 8, 
1971. It was not the intent of the letter to 
revoke the guarantee of December 17, 1970, or to 
cancel said guarantee but only to establish a new 
upper limit to the guarantee. Aside from lowering 
the upper limit of the guarantee, Midwest did not 
intend to have any other effect or modification of 
the guarantee of December 17, 1970." (R.110). 
The objective of the Brief filed by Midwest is to 
argue the facts of the case in an attempt to have a re-trial 
of the case in this Court. Midwest asks this Court to review 
the facts, resolve disputed facts, and draw inferences from 
the facts different than those drawn by the trial court. 
Midwest's argument completely ignores the established law 
announced many times by this Court that decisions by the 
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trier of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if there is any 
evidence to support them. This Court has held that it will not 
overrule the trier of fact "unless the evidence so unerringly 
pointed to a contrary conclusion that there existed no reasonable 
basis for the finding." Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Company, 
5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956). Accord, Aagard v. Dayton 
and Miller Red-E Mix Concrete Company, 12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 
522 (1961). The findings of a trial court will be reversed 
only if the finding "did such violence to common sense as to 
convince the Court that no fact trier, acting fairly and reason-
ably, would refuse to make such a finding. . ." Ray v. Consoli-
dated Freight Ways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196, 201 (1955). 
Accord, Wood v. Taylor, 8 Utah 2d 210, 332 P.2d 215 (1958). 
So long as there is evidence to support a factual determination, 
this Court will not reverse such determination even though 
this Court may disagree as to the factual decision. Brigham v. 
Moon Lake Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 
(1970). The policy of upholding all reasonable factual findings 
of the trial court is based in part upon its advantaged position 
in factual matters, Peterson v. Holloway, 8 Utah 2d 328, 334 
P.2d 559 (1959); Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 
(1958). 
With respect to the issues involved in the instant 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-11-
case, this Court has held that where the parties to a trans-
action dispute the intent surrounding some act involved in 
the transaction, the question of the intent is a factual 
issue and the determination of that factual issue will not 
be disturbed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it. 
Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972); Garrett 
Freight lines v. Cornwall, 120 Utah 175, 232 P.2d 786 (1951); 
Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 
450 P.2d 985 (1969). 
Midwest fails to understand that the question presented 
is not what the trial court could have reasonably found from 
the evidence. The question is, "are the findings that were 
actually made by the trial court supported by any evidence?" 
General Insurance Company v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440, 243 P.2d 433 
(1952). 
The apparent justification for arguing the facts of 
the case in the Appellate Court is the claim, unsupported by 
the citation of any case or authority, that this is an equity 
case and that the Appellate Court may therefore independently 
determine the disputed factual issues. Although Midwest cites 
several cases noting the standard to be applied in equity cases, 
there is not a single authority supporting the notion that this 
is an equity case* 
This is not an equity case, there are no grounds for 
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equitable relief. This Court has held: 
"If there is a legal remedy available to 
which resort may be had without any substantial 
or irreparable damage, one may not seek equity. 
Erisman v. Overman, 11 Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85, 
88 (1961)." 
The guarantees which are the subject matter of this case are 
common contracts used extensively in the commercial world. 
Power-line Company v. Russell's Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P. 2d 
906, 911 (1943). The Complaint in this action alleges a 
breach of said contract and seeks the legal remedy of money 
damages. All defenses asserted by Midwest are legal defenses. 
The equitable defenses of waiver and estoppel were waived by 
stipulation at the trial, Tr. 16. The remedies and defenses 
being legal in their nature, and said remedies and defenses 
being sufficient, there is no basis for the application of 
equitable principles. 
Even if there were an equity case, the evidence, 
summarized below, justifies the finding that the letter of 
July 6, 1971 was not a cancellation or revocation of the 
guarantees. The findings of the trial court would be 
upheld even under an equitable standard. The principles of 
equity state that findings of fact "will not be disturbed unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates against them and a manifest 
injustice or inequity is wrought." McCullough v. Wasserback, 
30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P.2d 691 (1974). 
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Inasmuch as the Court is concerned only with the 
question of whether there is evidence upon which the trial 
court could find that the July letter did not cancel the 
guarantee, the Bank will confine its argument to noting the 
evidence in support of the finding. The Bank will not attempt 
a complete response to Midwest's factual arguments wherein it 
cites evidence contrary to the Court's finding because consider-
ation of such evidence is irrelevant if the finding is supported 
by any evidence. See authorities cited above. 
The evidence in support of the Court's finding that 
the July letter did not constitute a cancellation or revocation 
of the guarantees is overwhelming. 
The July letter clearly unequivocally stated: 
"It is our desire that the guarantee be 
immediately reduced to the amount of the outstanding 
obligations covered by the L.E.E. Chair note. We 
believe this to be about $85,000.00." 
There is simply no other way to interpret the above 
language than to conclude that Midwest wished a ceiling on the 
account so as to limit their exposure under the guarantee. 
The most convincing evidence that a cancellation was 
not intended, is the wording in the letter which refers to 
revocation or cancellation. Both references clearly established 
that Midwest contemplated cancellation or revocation in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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future, and did not intend a revocation or cancellation at the 
present time: 
"It was the decision of the Board that we will 
withdraw the 'continuing guarantee1 of Midwest 
Realty & Finance, Inc., for and on behalf of L.E.E. 
Chair Corporation. . . 
We would appreciate your earliest reply, indicat-
ing any further requirements for finalizing this 
cancellation." 
It is apparent from the above quoted language that 
the lestter was not to be understood as an immediate cancellation 
or revocation. If Midwest intended the letter to constitute 
a cancellation, it would not have requested "further require-
ments for finalizing this cancellation." 
As noted in the letter, the execution and delivery of 
the letter was authorized by Midwest's Board of Directors. A 
member of that Board of Directors, present when the letter 
commujiication was decided upon, reaffirmed that the intent of 
the letter was to "cap" the guarantee rather than to cancel 
the quarantee: :,,• . 
"Q. . . And I presume that you had some 
discussion concerning this letter, before it 
was sent, did you not? 
A. The Board of Directors did, yes. 
Q. And when you say the Board of Directors 
did, then that letter accurately sets forth 
their intent and their discussion with regard to 
that letter. Is that correct? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. Certainly. 
MR. CONDER: I object, your Honor. The 
letter speaks for itself. 
THE COURT: I don't know without looking 
at it. I will strike it if it does. 
Q. Now, the intent of the Board as expressed 
in that letter, was it not, was to reduce the 
upper limit from $130,000.00 down to $85,000.00, 
was it not? 
A. That's what it says. 
Q. Certainly. And you personally agreed on 
behalf of Midwest Realty to allow advances to keep 
Lee Chair Corporation going so long as the upper 
limit of that guarantee was capped or a ceiling 
was put on it, did you not? 
A. I did not personally agree to it. 
Q. Well, that was generally the intent and 
discussion when the letter was sent, was it not? 
A. I can't recall exactly the conversation 
at the Board meeting, but that was the intent I 
assume by this letter." (Testimony of John G. 
Wells, Director of Midwest Realty, Tr. 12-13). 
On July 8, 1971, the date that the letter of July 6, 
1971 was received by the Bank, Mr. John G. Wells of Midwest 
had a telephone conversation with a Mr. Walter J. Winrow of 
the Bank (Tr. 13-14). At this time it was the policy of the 
Bank to make memoranda of all telephone conversations to avoid 
problems occasioned by employee turn-over (Tr. 38). In 
accordance with this policy of record keeping, Mr. Winrow made 
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notes of the telephone conversation on the original of the 
July letter (Tr. 38-39). This memorandum of the conversation, 
by reason of the passage of time, constitutes the most reliable 
summary of the substance of the conversation. The handwritten 
memorandum summarizes the conversation as follows: 
"Talked to J. Wells on 7-8-71 in detail about 
my concern if guarantee reduced. I said I would 
like to keep guarantee at $130,000.00 and indefinitely 
'cap' the amount of receivables financing at current 
bal of 31,212. He agreed. We also agreed on an 
approx. 30 day deadline to define the intentions 
of Midwest and Lee Chair. It's also understood 
the 'cap1 fig. in the receivables line would be 
reviewed if Lee Chair could convince Midwest and 
we had new authorization. Magg has been informed 
and agrees to these conditions WJW." (Exhibit 13) 
The resolutions passed by the Board of Directors 
of Midwest which authorized the execution delivery of both 
guarantees provided: 
"Be it further resolved, that the authority 
hereby conferred is in addition to the authority 
conferred by any other resolution heretofore or 
hereafter delivered to Bank and will continue in 
full force and effect until Bank shall have re-
ceived official notice in writing from this 
corporation of the revocation hereof by a resolu-
tion duly adopted by the Board of Directors of 
this corporation and such revocation shall be 
effective only as to loans made by Bank subsequent 
to the receipt by it of such official notice." 
(Exhibits 12 and 4)(Emphasis added.) 
A review of the minutes of the meetings of the 
Board of Directors of Midwest reveals that prior to July 6, 
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1971, it passed no resolution whatsoever which indicated or 
even suggested that the guarantee should be revoked or 
cancelled. 
A review of the resolutions and minutes of the 
meetings of the Board of Directors of Midwest show that a 
meeting was held each year. However, the minutes or resolutions 
for the year 1971 are absent for some unexplained reason. In 
any event, the resolution and minutes which were produced by 
Midwest establish that there was no resolution prior to July, 
1971, revoking or cancelling the guarantee (Tr. 23-24, Exhibit 
1). The only resolution on the subject matter prior to July, 
1971, was a resolution authorizing the officers to enter into 
the guarantee arrangement (Exhibit 1). 
After the telephone conversation between Wells and 
Winrow on July 8, 1971, the Bank sent a letter to Midwest 
setting forth the substance of that conversation. The letter 
stated: 
"As to your letter of July 6, 1971, we have 
discussed this with Mr. Winrow and he stated that 
according to his conversation with Mr. Wells, the 
intent of the letter was to 'cap1 the borrowing 
which was done."(Exhibit 8) 
Upon receipt of the letter by Midwest, there was 
no response denying that characterization of the conversation, 
denying the statement as to the intent of the letter, nor was 
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there any act on the part of Midwest which indicated that the 
letter was not an accurate statement of the conversation and 
of the intent of the July, 1971 letter (Tr. 21). 
The officers of Midwest were well aware that Lee 
Chair was in a precarious financial position and needed 
substcintial credit to maintain current operations (Tr. 10-11). 
It was therefore apparent that a sudden termination of all 
credit would have the immediate effect of forcing Lee Chair 
to terminate business and thereby lose any hope that Lee Chair 
could pay or reduce the debt from its current income. The 
trier of fact was entitled to infer that Midwest would not act 
imprudently; that Midwest had nothing to lose by "capping" the 
account since they were already liable for the indebtedness 
incurred to date; and, that Midwest had everything to lose by 
suddenly cutting off all credit and forcing Lee Chair out of 
business without giving it the opportunity to pay or reduce the 
debt. A sudden cancellation of the guarantee and the resulting 
sudden cancellation of credit to Lee Chair would have been an 
imprudent and unreasonable act and thus the trier of fact was 
justified in concluding that a cancellation of the guarantee 
was not intended. 
Both the December and November Guarantee provided 
that they were cumulative with each other rather than superseding 
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Nevertheless, the July letter mentioned only the December 
Guarantee. There was no mention of the November Guarantee. 
This omission reveals the true intent of the letter. The 
failure to mention the November Guarantee is consistent with 
an intent to "cap" the indebtedness at its then current level. 
An intent to cap the guarantee did not require mention of 
the November Guarantee inasmuch as the indebtedness was already 
at the upper limit of that guarantee. On the other hand, an 
intent to cap the accounts, rather than to cancel them, would 
require only mention of the December Guarantee since the 
indebtedness under that guarantee had not yet reached the 
maximum. If the intent had been to cancel or terminate all 
guarantees, Midwest would surely have mentioned the November 
Guarantee inasmuch as it involved more indebtedness than did 
the December Guarantee. The trier of fact was entitled to 
infer that Midwest would act consistently: that it would not 
have mentioned the November Guarantee if "capping" the account 
were intended whereas mention of the November Guarantee was 
necessary if cancellation of the guarantee was intended. 
The above evidence is ample support for the finding 
of the Court that the intent of the July, 1971 letter was to 
"cap" the indebtedness guarantee and not to revoke the guarantee. 
It was the exclusive province of the lower court, as the trier 
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of fact, to resolve the dispute by finding that there was no 
cancellation of the guarantee even though there was evidence 
on the other side of the issue.. There is seldom a case where 
there is not evidence on both sides of the factual disputes. 
However, once the factual issues are decided, the decision 
is final if there is evidence to support the finding. The 
above review of the evidence demonstrates that there is 
evidence to support the lower court's finding. Midwest's 
review of contrary evidence is of no relevance to the issues 
presented by this appeal and could only result in a re-trial 
of the factual issues at the appellate level. 
POINT II. 
ALL OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION 
THAT THE JULY LETTER CONSTITUTES A CANCELLATION OR SAID 
ARGUMENTS ARE BASED UPON FACTUAL DISPUTES 
The only real issue involved on this appeal is the 
determination of the intent surrounding the execution and 
delivery of the letter of July 6, 1971. Midwest admitted at 
trial that this was the sole issue before the court and Midwest 
waived all equitable defenses: 
"MR. CONDER: Now, also in the interest of 
time, your Honor, although the pleadings have 
raised the question of consideration for the 
guarantee, we will waive that. We are not going 
to raise that. 
The pleadings raised the question of estoppel. 
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We are not going to raise that. 
We have only got one issue here, and we 
admit that the guarantees were secured. We 
admit that the money was advanced by the Bank, 
but we argue that the guarantee was cancelled 
and that the Bank made advances after that 
time and, therefore, that releases the guarantor. 
It gets down to that simple issue. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. McDONALD: I assume also then, Mr. 
Conder, you are waiving the defense of waiver 
as well as estoppel and also the defense of 
failure of demand? 
MR. CONDER: Yes. We have only the one 
issue." (Tr. 16) 
Inasmuch as the sole issue has been decided by the 
trier of fact on the basis of the evidence at trial, all argu-
ments assuming a contrary fact are irrelevant. All arguments 
which attempt a re-trial on the basis of disputed facts are 
likewise irrelevant since such argument is outside the scope 
of review. See cases above cited. 
Under Point II of its Brief, Midwest argues that the 
December Guarantee superseded the November Guarantee. The sole 
purpose of this argument is to "combine" the guarantees so as 
to make the July letter applicable to both guarantees rather than 
just the December Guarantee which is the only one mentioned in 
the letter. 
The entire issue raised under Point II is irrelevant 
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if the Court sustains the finding of the trial court that the 
July letter "capped" the guarantee and did not constitute a 
cancellation. If the July letter merely capped the guarantee 
and did not constitute a cancellation, it makes no difference 
whether or not it applied to the November Guarantee because the 
indebtedness under the November Guarantee was already at its 
maximum limit at the time the July letter was received. 
In a further attempt to "combine" the guarantees so 
as to make the July letter applicable to both, Midwest argues 
under Point II of its Brief, that the conduct of the parties 
should be considered. Midwest then notes a series of innocuous 
acts which consist mainly of correspondence referring to the 
guarantees in the singular rather than in the plural. 
As previously noted, if the Court sustains the factual 
findings of the trial court, it makes no difference whether or 
not the guarantees are "combined" because if the July letter 
"capped" the guarantees rather than cancel the guarantees, it 
would have no effect on the November Guarantee which was already 
at its maximum limit. Furthermore, any inference with respect 
to the conduct of the parties is a factual matter that has 
already been disposed of in the trial court. The trial court 
specifically found that the December Guarantee did not supersede 
the November Guarantee (R.111). The cases, above quoted, 
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exclude consideration of the factual disputes. Finally, 
the cases which permit the conduct of the parties to be consider-
ed in determining the meaning of a contract apply only to 
situations where the meaning of the contract is ambiguous. In 
the instant case, the contractual provisions clearly and 
unequivocally state that the December Guarantee is to be 
cumulative and in addition to the obligation of the November 
Guarantee. See paragraph 2 of the guarantees, Exhibits 3 
and 11. The unambiguous contractual terms preclude consider-
ation of the conduct of the parties under the parol evidence 
rule« Parr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143^P.2d 
281(1943); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
Under Point III of its Brief, Midwest attempts a re-
trial of the case by reviewing all of the evidence favorable 
to its position and then asks this Court to make a factual 
finding on the basis of this evidence contrary to the factual 
findings of the trial court. Such an argument ignores the 
scope of review in this matter. Since the factual findings 
of the trial court were supported by the evidence reviewed 
under Point I of this Brief, this Court will not conduct a 
re-trial of the facts on appeal. Ray v. Consolidated Freight-
ways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196 (1955); Wood v. Taylor, 8 Utah 
2d 210, 332 P.2d 215 (1958); Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39 
492 P.2d 1343 (1972); Garrett Freightlines v. Cornwall, 120 
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Utah 175, 232 P.2d 786 (1951); Youngren v, John W. Lloyd Con-
struction Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969); 
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Company, 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 
622 (1956); Aagard v. Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company, 
12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 522 (1961). General Insurance Company v. 
Lewis,121 Utah 440, 243 P.2d 433 (1952). 
Under Point IV of its Brief, Midwest argues that 
since the guarantees were revoked in July, 1971, any extension 
or renwal of credit after that date is not the responsibility 
of the guarantor. Such an argument assumes that the July 
letter constituted a cancellation of the guarantee which is 
contrary to the express findings of the trial court (R. 110-111). 
Inasmuch as the trial court held that the July letter did not 
constitute a cancellation, the question of liability for 
extensions or renewals of credit after a cancellation is already 
determined and is not subject to review. 
Under Point IV of its Brief, Midwest argues that 
the terms of the continuing guarantees authorized the Bank to 
apply collateral in reduction of the debt. Midwest then goes 
on to argue, without any reference to the evidence in the case, 
that the Bank failed to apply the proceeds of the accounts 
receivable to the indebtedness. However, a cursory review of 
the Bank's records (Exhibit 10) demonstrates that between the 
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date the letter was received and the date of the commencement 
of this suit the sum of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred 
Ninety-Eight Dollars and 71/100 cents ($23,798.71) was applied 
to the indebtedness from the collateral. Moreover, by the 
terms of the guarantee, the Bank was not compelled to liquidate 
the collateral but merely had the option to do so. There is 
no evidence whatsoever that the Bank did not use diligence in 
collecting the accounts receivable and in applying the same 
to the indebtedness. 
Under Point V of its Brief, Midwest agains asserts 
an argument based upon the assumption that the July letter 
constituted a cancellation of the guarantee. The argument, 
and the cases cited, all involve a cancellation which is absent 
in the instant case. 
Under Point VI of its Brief, defendant again asserts 
an argument based upon the assumption that the July letter 
constituted a cancellation. 
POINT III. 
IF THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE REVERSED, 
MIDWEST IS STILL LIABLE UNDER ITS GUARANTEES. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this Court 
were to review the factual findings of the trial court and 
reverse the same, Midwest would still be liable under its 
guarantees. 
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First, even if the July letter were regarded as a 
cancellation, under no stretch of the imagination could it 
cancel the November Guarantee. The letter referred specifically 
to the December Guarantee and made no reference whatsoever to 
the November Guarantee. These were separate and distinct 
guarantees, and the December Guarantee did not supersede the 
November Guarantee. 
The December Guarantee specifically provided in 
paragraph 2 that it was "in addition to any obligations of 
guarantors. . .under any other guarantees of indebtedness of 
borrowers. . .heretofore given. . .to Bank." This language 
is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to any contrary >' 
construction. Paragraph 2 of the November Guarantee provided 
that it was "in addition to any obligations of guarantors. . . 
under any other guarantees of indebtedness of borrowers. . .here-
after to be given to Bank." Thus, both guarantees clearly 
state their relationship with the other and no strained con-
struction can insert any ambiguity into the clear and unequivo-
cal meaning of the language. Thus, if the July letter were a 
cancellation, it can only cancel the guarantee which it purported 
to cancel. The letter specifically mentioned the December 
Guarantee and made no mention whatsoever of the November Guarante 
Midwest cited several cases supporting the proposition 
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that the conduct of the parties may be considered in determining 
the meaning of ambiguous contract provisions. Inasmuch as 
there is no ambiguity in the provisions relating to the relation 
ship between the two guarantees# the conduct of the parties 
is irrelevant. Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143 
P.2d 281 (1943); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
Even if the contractual provisions were ambiguous, 
the conduct cited by Midwest is far from sufficient to give 
the Court any insight as to the meaning of the terms. The 
unilateral undisclosed intent of G. R. Harmon, President of 
Midwest, could have no bearing on the meaning of the contract 
which is diametrically opposed to his unilateral understanding. 
The fact that correspondence between the parties referred to 
"guarantee" in the singular is insufficient to change the terms 
of the contract. In each instance, the parties were not pur-
porting to state their intent as to the cumulative effect of 
the guarantees. Moreover, the reference to "guarantee" in the 
singular is not grammatically incorrect. The fact that there 
are two documents does not require reference to guarantees in 
the plural. A debtor who executes two notes to a Bank does not 
thereafter require the Bank in their correspondence to refer 
to his "debts" in the plural. It is grammatically correct to 
refer to his obligation as a "debt" in the singular despite 
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the fact that the single debt is evidenced by two separate 
promissory notes. 
If Midwest's argument were accepted, it would have 
a catastrophic effect in commerce. The terms of an agreement 
could be altered or amended by a secretary, clerk, or officer 
of the corporation by an inadvertent reference which was not 
consistent with the legal effect of a contract. Such a 
ruling would require every correspondence which made any 
reference to the legal rights of the author to be reviewed 
by attorneys. 
The fact that account cards kept by the Bank 
designated only the December Guarantee during the period from 
February 1971 to July 1971, and thereafter showed no guarantee 
at all, is of no significance to the issues before the Court. 
The account cards were maintained to record payments and 
advances and did not purport to be an official statement of the 
Bank's legal rights with respect to the debtor (Tr. 45). If 
Midwest*s argument were accepted, filing clerks and bookkeepers 
would require constant legal advice to assure that the internal 
records of the Bank contained no notation inconsistent with the 
legal rights of the Bank. 
Midwest cites 100 A.L.R. 1236 and other texts in 
support of the proposition that renewals or extensions of 
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pre-existing indebtedness after cancellation of a guarantee 
are not binding on the guarantor, A review of this annotation 
reveals that there is a split of authority on that particular 
question. Some courts hold the guarantor liable for renewals 
and extensions of credit after cancellation so long as there 
is no new money advanced nor any increase in the indebtedness. 
Of significance to this case, the State of California subscribes 
to this latter view: renewals of existing indebtedness after 
cancellation which do not involve the advance of new money are 
still the responsibility of the guarantor if the indebtedness 
renewed was existing prior to cancellation of the guarantee, cf. 
Rodabaugh v. Kauffman, 200 P. 747 (Cal. 1921); First National 
Bank of Redondo v. Spalding, 170 P. 407 (Cal. 1918); American 
Trust Company v. Jones, 20 P.2d 346 (Cal. 1933). The law of 
California governs this case inasmuch as the Bank is a California 
banking institution engaged in the practice of banking in the 
State of California; the debt which was guaranteed by Midwest 
was negotiated and incurred in the State of California; Lee 
Chair Corporation is a California corporation that operates 
in the State of California; the obligation to guarantee indebt-
edness was incurred each time there was an advance to Lee 
Chair (R. 141) and thus the obligation of guarantee was made in 
the State of California (Tr. 54). 
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With respect to the accounts receivable financing, 
if the July 8, 1971 letter is construed as a cancellation, 
Midwest was not prejudice by the later extensions of credit 
inasmuch as said extensions enabled Lee Chair to remain in 
busines.s and reduce the indebtedness on the accounts receivable 
financing by an amount equal to Twenty-Three Thousand Seven 
Hundred Ninety-Eight Dollars and 71/100 cents ($23,798.71) 
(Exhibit 10). 
If the July 6, 1971 letter is construed as a cancella-
tion, and it were held that Midwest is not liable for later 
advances of credit, then it follows that Midwest would not be 
entitled to benefit from any payments made on the debt from 
accounts receivable created after the date of the cancellation. 
In this regard, Midwest totally failed in its burden of proof 
as to the extent of its liability. It offered no evidence with 
respect to the identity of the accounts receivable which were 
credited as payments to the indebtedness after July 6, 1971. The 
question of payments is a matter of defense, and the burden of 
proof rests upon Midwest. Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedui 
Having claimed a cancellation of liability, Midwest had the burdei 
of proving which payments were attributable to its liability 
and it was entitled to the benefit only from payments attributabl 
to accounts receivable credited prior to its cancellation. 
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Having failed in that burden, the Court was entitled to assume 
that all payments made on the accounts receivable financing 
discharged advances made subsequent to July 6, 1971. Accord-
ingly, even if the guarantee were cancelled, the remaining 
indebtedness was attributable to advances prior to cancellation. 
^2
 v vN CONCLUSION 
The sole issue before the trial court was the legal 
effect of the letter of July 6, 1971. The respective parties 
produced evidence with respect to that intent, including the 
letter itself, and all of said evidence was available to the 
trial court in determining the issue. The trial court, sitting 
as the trier of fact, determined that the intent of the letter 
was to cap the accounts receivable at the level of indebtedness 
existing on the date the letter was received, July 8, 1971. 
There was sufficient evidence to justify this finding. Inas-
much as the amount of indebtedness existing on July 8, 1971 
was never exceeded, the trier of fact properly determined 
that Midwest was liable for later renewals or extensions of 
credit. This factual determination is not subject to re-trial 
on appeal and the judgment based upon said factual determination 
should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
JONES,) WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully moves the Court 
for its Order awarding attorneys fees on appeal in this 
matter for legal services incurred in connection with the 
appeal, the amount of said fees to be determined upon remand 
on the basis of evidence to be presented to the lower court. 
All attorneys fees granted to date in the lower court are 
attributable solely to legal services prior to the appeal in 
this matter. This Motion is made pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph 9 of the November Guarantee and the December 
Guarantee which paragraphs provide: 
"Guarantors agree to pay a reasonable attorneys' 
fee and all other costs and expenses which may be 
incurred by Bank in the enforcement of this guarantee 
and in the collection of indebtedness of borrowers 
to Bank." 
The above quoted provisions entitle plaintiff-respondent to 
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compensation for said attorneys fees and the failure to award 
the same would result in a reduction of the recovery of funds 
loaned in reliance upon said guarantees. 
Dated this the J?2Tday df JuJ4C# 1975. 
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